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Abstract： Secure key rate of decoy-state quantum key distribution protocols has 
been improved with biased basis choice, however, the security standards and 
parameters of current protocols are different. As a result, we cannot give an 
accurate key rate comparison between different kinds of protocols. Taking the 
schemes based on different formula of secure key rate as examples, we give a fair 
comparison between typical protocols under universal composable security 
standard. Through analyzing the relationship of security parameters in 
post-processing stage and final secure key, we achieve the unified quantification 
between protocols based on Gottesman-Lo-Lütkenhaus-Preskill formula and the 
ones under universal composable security.  Based on the above research, the 
impact of different sending length and secure parameters on secure key rate is 
investigated, meanwhile, we give the dependent relationship between secure key 
rate and sending length under different secure parameters. Besides, we analyze the 
importance and conditions of fair comparison. For the first time we give a fair 
comparison between the protocols based on GLLP formula and smooth entropy, 
and taking Raymond protocol and Toshiba protocol as examples, we analyze the 
way for improving secure key rate in the light intensity choice and the single bit 
error rate estimation method.  
Keywords: quantum key distribution, finite-key, universal composable, fair 
comparison 
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1 Introduction 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides unconditional secure shared key for 
communication parties based on quantum mechanics. Under ideal conditions, the ways 
of security proof mainly include uncertainty principle[1-3], entanglement distillation 
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protocol (EDP) [4-6] and information theory[7]. However, the ideal conditions are 
difficult to achieve in practical QKD systems. For the imperfect cases of practical 
QKD systems, Gottesman et al. conducted a deep research on security analysis[8] and 
presented GLLP formula based on the EDP protocol, the security of which is equal to 
BB84 protocol[9]. In order to securely apply the final key in message encryption, 
Mayers[10] and Renner[11] brought universal composable (UC) frame from classical 
cryptography into QKD schemes based on BB84 protocol, describing 
indistinguishability between the ideal and practical secure schemes by trace distance. 
Besides, for the potential security danger brought by multi-photon pulses and practical 
quantum channel loss, Hwang[14], Wang[15] and Lo[16], respectively presented 
decoy-state idea and practical decoy-state QKD schemes, greatly improving the secure 
key rate. Communication parties transfer finite data since the communication time is 
limited in realistic conditions. As a result, the related research of decoy-state QKD 
postprocessing schemes is gradually turning into finite-key schemes [17-33]. 
Current decoy-state QKD protocols, provide many different ways based on light 
intensity choice, key generating part, bias basis setting and so on, claiming that they 
have improved secure key generation rate to some extent. 
In ref. [22], they use Z basis of signal state for generating the final key, choose 
the signal state’s light intensity smaller than decoy-state, and set the probability of 
choosing X basis for decoy state as 1. They can generate the final secure key under the 
length of 610  bits of receiving code.  
Ref. [24] chooses the signal state’s light intensity larger than decoy-state, and sets 
the probability of choosing Z basis for signal state as 1. Compared with standard BB84 
protocol, its secure key rate is improved by 45 percent. 
In ref. [32], they generate key in both X basis and Z basis of signal state, and 
claim that the scheme had so far achieved the highest key rate compared with other 
experimental ones. 
However, the researches concerning the improvement of secure key rate mostly 
pay attention to the simple comparison between the protocol and standard BB84 
protocol on the infinite-key condition [15, 16, 17, 24, 33]. There are few papers about 
efficiency comparisons between protocols based on different security standards and 
parameters. 
In ref. [24], the formula of secure key rate based on GLLP formula, just including 
the security parameters of some postprocessing stage and considering other stages as 
perfect, is not overall.  
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Ref. [22, 23, 34] claim that their protocols are under UC security standard all, 
however, when it comes to the security parameters of postprocessing stages, their 
analysis is different and so is the UC security standard definition. For example, in ref. 
[22], three parameters of failure probability and parameters of smooth entropy in the 
postprocessing stage are defined as its UC security standard parameters. Ref. [33] 
interprets it as the sum of security and correctness parameters of final key, and security 
parameters description is based on trace distance. As for Ref. [24], they reaesrch 
parameters of failure probability in postprocessing stages by quantum fidelity. 
Therefore, a standard and platform of fair comparison is needed urgently to test 
secure key rate of decoy-state QKD protocols so that the improvement of secure key 
rate of decoy-state QKD protocols with biased basis choice is provided reference. 
Considering the overall factors influencing the secure key rate is the difficulty of 
fair efficiency comparison. As a result of it, for the new decoy-state QKD protocols of 
biased basis choice raised in the last two years, and according to different features in 
formula of secure key rate, light intensity choice, bias basis setting and more, our 
article uses typical protocols to analyze. Firstly we research the unified quantification 
relationship of security parameters between decoy-state QKD schemes based on GLLP 
formula and protocols under UC security standard, and achieve the conversion of 
protocols from non-UC security to UC security. On this basis, we research the 
influence of different sending length and security parameters on the secure key rate 
using the protocol based on GLLP formula under UC security standard (UC-Wei 
protocol). Meanwhile, taking the protocol based on smooth entropy (UC-Raymond 
protocol) as examples, our article analyzes the dependent relationship between secure 
key rate and sending length under different security parameters. Then on the condition 
of the same finite-key length，security parameters and statistical fluctuation method, 
we analyze the importance and conditions of fair comparison. We note that the 
comparison in this article is relatively fair. 
For the first time we give a fair efficiency comparison between decoy-state QKD 
protocols with biased basis choice based on GLLP formula and protocols based on 
Devetak-Winter bound[35] and smooth entropy, and this is the main contribution of this 
article. After that we analyze the advantage brought by involving decoy state in key 
generation on the basis of UC-Raymond protocol, which uses single signal sate to 
generate key. Finally we take Toshiba protocol（T12 protocol）[32] as an example to 
research advantages and disadvantages between different single bit error rate 
estimation methods. Because the comparisons in our article take contrast effects 
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between different key lengths into consideration, conclusions can provide reference to 
the application of decoy-state QKD protocols. 
The article is organized as follows. Section II introduces the definition of UC 
security standard and UC security parameters, and analyzes the unified quantification 
interrelation between protocols under non-UC security and the ones under UC security 
standard. Section III researches the relationship of sending length, security parameters 
and secure key rate. Section V discusses the importance and conditions of fair 
efficiency comparison, and its point is in three aspects. We conclude in VI. 
2 Analysis of security standard 
2.1 UC security standard  
UC security definition [8] : in the decoy-state QKD protocols under the finite-key 
condition, and assuming the adversary, Eve, adopts the optimal attack strategy, the 
final key is called   indistinguishable with unconditionally secure key, or,  UC 
secure,  if 0  , 
                    
1
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where the trace distance
1 1
2 2
Tr       is the maximum probability of 
distinguishing the two quantum states ρ and σ，and
SE is the classic & quantum mixed 
state of Alice’s classical key S and the eavesdropper, Eve’s quantum state, E. 
S  
denotes the fully mixed state on S and 
E  is the Eve’s quantum state. 
2.2 UC security parameter 
     Security parameter is generally considered as the failure probability of the 
whole QKD protocol or some postprocessing stage. Regarding   in the UC security 
definition as the UC security parameter of final key of decoy-state QKD protocols, and 
assuming that   is the failure probability of protocols under UC security standard in 
the post-processing stage, we can get   . 
    QKD postprocessing procedure [34] contains five elements mainly, including basis 
sifting, bit error correction, error verification, parameter estimation and privacy 
amplification. Among them the basis sifting stage is mostly finished in an 
authenticated classical channel and is thought as ideal. We assume that the others have 
failure probability under UC security standard, and in a sense the smooth entropy 
parameter is a failure probability [8]. In the current decoy-state QKD protocols under 
UC security standard, the formula of secure key rate are based on uncertainty 
reletion[33] between Devetak-Winter bound[22,32] and smooth entropy, so its analysis of 
 5 
failure probability in the postprocessing procedure and smooth entropy parameters are 
based on trace distance directly. While in the decoy-state QKD protocols based on 
GLLP formula [24] , we just focus on the failure probability of random sampling in 
phase error rate estimation step under the finite-key condition, under non-UC security. 
Because GLLP formula derivation is on the basis of EDP protocol, its security 
parameter description is based on quantum fidelity 
2.3 Security parameter quantization 
We assume that 0UCBC  ， 0UCEV  ， 0UCPE  ， 0UCPA   and 0UC  are respectively 
failure probability of bit error correction, error verification , parameter estimation , 
privacy amplification and smooth entropy parameter in the postprocessing procedure 
in the decoy-state QKD protocols with smooth entropy on the finite-key condition 
under UC security standard, and that they satisfy 
UCPE UC   . Besides, define SEPEn  is 
numbers of parameters needing estimation. For that the description of related secure 
parameters is based on trace distance, the UC security parameter of final key can be 
defined as the sum of the whole security parameters in the postprocessing stage and 
the smooth entropy parameter : 
UC UC UC UCBC UCEV PE UCPE UCPA UCn              . 
Taking Wei protocol as an example, apart from the failure probability of phrase 
error estimation in parameter estimation, the one in the postprocessing stage is also 
supposed to be taken into consideration, to achieve the quantification from decoy-state 
QKD protocol based on GLLP formula to the protocols under UC security standard. 
Similarly, we define 0GBC  ， 0GEV  ， 0GPE   and 0GPA  are respectively failure 
probability of the last four elements above, and 
GPEn  is the number of parameters 
needing estimation except phase error rate, and in Wei protocol it is 4, thus the whole 
security parameter in the postprocessing stage is GLLP GBC GEV GPE GPE GPA Gphn          .  
According to the quantification relationship between quantum fidelity and trace 
distance[34], 21 ( , )Tr F      , where
1 1
2 2( , )F Tr     is the quantum fidelity 
between quantum states  and  , we can get the correspondence equation 
(2 )GLLP GLLP GLLP    between GLLP ,the failure probability in the postprocessing stage 
in Wei protocol, and 
GLLP ,the UC security parameter of final key ,and it is an 
important basis for the analysis of of security parameters between two protocols under 
UC security standard. Therefore, on condition that the UC security parameters of final 
key are the same in two protocols, the quantitative equation is 
(2 )UC UC UC GLLP GLLP GLLP                                  （2）  
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2.4 Security parameter value choice 
    The security of a QKD protocol can be showed by UC security parameter values 
of final key, and the smaller parameter represents the more secure protocol. For 
example, the parameter of final key in the Raymond protocol[22] is 510 ,and comparing 
it with the one in the T12 protocol， 1010 ，which has been realized in experiment, we 
find it obvious that the latter security is better. Besides, secure key rate of finite-key 
protocol is influenced by security parameter choice to an extent. Taking UC-Wei 
protocol and UC-Raymond protocol as examples, we research the influence on the 
secure key rate between different key length and security parameter choice in detail in 
the third part. 
3 Security parameter and finite-key length 
     Firstly taking Wei protocol in Ref. [24] as an example, the influence on secure 
key rate of protocols based on GLLP formula under UC security standard of security 
parameter value choices is analyzed. The formula of UC-Wei protocol reads:  
 1 1 0( ) [1 ( )]
Bz z pz WEV WPA
Wei
N p k k
R fQ H E Q H e Q
N N

 

                 (3) 
where because error verification stage uses failure probability 
GEV to guarantee the 
high consistance of bit of communication parties and that if this verification fails, the 
parties either go back to the bit error correction step or abort the QKD process, so we 
define the error correction stage ideal. Besides, error verification stage, which is 
performed by using sets of Toeplitz matrices, consumes key bits  21 log
Bz
WEV
GEV
NP q
k


  . 
Similarly
WPAk is secret key bits consumed in privacy amplification stage, and 
2
1
1 log
Bz
WPA
GPA
NP q l
k


 
  ,where l is the length of final key, and 
 1 1 0 ( )
1
[1 ( )] log
2 Bz
z pz
Bz NP p l
l N p Q H e Q

  
    . Define Gph  is the failure probability of 
phase error estimation and satisfies 0Gph W xP    ,where  PrW x pz bx xP e e     is the 
failure probability of phase error estimation in the Z basis, 
pze  is the single phase 
error rate in the Z basis,  
bxe  is the single bit error rate in the X basis ,and 
x represents the deviation between pze and bxe . Intuitively, while security parameters 
in error verification and privacy amplification are smaller, the bits consumed are larger. 
In the following, to research the statistical fluctuation effect of measuring parameters 
under finite key condition conveniently, we will focus on the failure probability of 
protocols using statistical fluctuation. 
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    To check the effect of finite-key length and security parameter choice on secure 
key rate, we define the finite-key length 9 12 15{6 10 ,10 ,10 }N   , where the finite-key 
length refers to sending quantum bit length, and 96 10  is the shortest sending length 
to generate key in UC-Wei protocol. Then we choose the relatively secure UC security 
parameter of final key, 101 10Wei
  , and the one of original Wei protocol, 
' ' 75.73 10W x GPEP  
   , which corresponding ' 32.5 10Wei
  . The statistical fluctuation 
method is still standard error analysis , and other practical system parameters remain 
constant. Figure 1(we use figure 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 to denote the above left, the 
above right, the lower left and the lower right graph) is the contrast diagram of secure 
key rate between different finite-key length when the security parameter is the same or 
different security parameter while the length is the same, where t  represents channel 
transmission loss, R  is secure key rate, and sp  is UC security parameter value 
choice. 
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Figure 1: contrast diagram of security key rate 
Figure 1.1 and 1.2 show changes of related secure key rate of two security 
parameters. 
Through numerical optimization, we can find that when the finite-key length 
151 10N   , the curves have a steady decline trend in two subgraphs along with the 
increase of channel loss. While the finite key is shorter, the influence of statistical 
fluctuation becomes greater, and so the decline trend is quicker.  
Figure 1.3 and 1.4 are contrast diagrams of related secure key rate between 
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different UC security parameters when 96 10N   and 151 10N   . 
We can conclude from figure 1.3 that when UC security parameter 101 10Wei
  , 
secure key rate is lower. It is because 101 10Wei
   is corresponded with the major 
security parameter in the post-processing stage, 211 10W x GPEP  
   , which is less than 
' ' 75.73 10W x GPEP  
    far in the original protocol, and it results that in the phrase error 
rate estimation and standard error analysis，deviation’s and standard error’s multiples 
are larger，with 
Wx Gx   and 9.5 5W Gu u    ，where Wx  and Gx  is respectively 
the deviations of phrase error rate estimation in two parameter values, and 
Wu   and 
Gu  are respectively the standard error multiples when using standard error analysis. 
We can see that the security parameter value choice can influence secure key rate in a 
degree, and when the security command is higher, the related rate is lower. 
    In the figure 1.4 we can see that the curves in different security parameters almost 
coincide. This is to say, when the sending length is comparatively long, the influence 
on secure key rate of security parameter can be ignored. Taking 151 10N    as an 
example, we choose the channel loss 25t dB , and the ratios between deviation and 
measuring values in statistical fluctuation, and the ratios between the error of secure 
key rate resulted from the deviation and key rate with infinite-key length are shown in 
table 1.  
Table 1 ratios of related parameters  
ratio \ security 
parameter 
Q  vQ  0Y  0Q  x  R  
32.5 10  23.6 10  52.0 10  31.2 10  32.0 10  32.5 10  1.8% 
101 10  24.8 10  53.7 10  31.8 10  33.4 10  34.3 10  2.5% 
In table 1 Q , vQ , 0Y , 0Q , x and R  respectively represent the ratios 
between the deviation and measuring values, and the proportion that the difference 
resulted from these deviations accounts for in the secure key rate on the infinite-key 
length in phrase error rate, signal state detection rate, decoy-state detection rate, 
vacuum state detection rate and the detection rate of vacuum pulse in signal state. 
From these ratios, we can conclude that the proportion of deviation of relevant 
parameters occupying in the measuring values is rather small, and that the proportions 
of difference of secure key rate resulted 1.8% and 2.5%, are less than the ones (26.8% 
and 35.0%) when 96 10N   far. The analysis above shows that when the sending 
length is comparatively long, the effect of secure parameter value choice and related 
statistical fluctuation can decrease to a pretty small order of magnitude. Therefore, in 
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practical QKD systems, we can increase sending length properly to reduce the 
influence of statistical fluctuation. For example, assume sending length 151 10N   ,and 
101 10Wei
   , ' 32.5 10Wei
  , both of ratios of secure key rate, 9.9823  and 9.9750 , is 
close to 1. 
The analysis above shows the dependent relationship between secure key rate and 
sending length when security parameters are different. In other word, a right length 
exits which can reduce the influence of statistical fluctuation greatly. To confirm 
further the reasonableness of the conclusion, we uses the protocol based on smooth 
entropy (Raymond protocol) to this relationship. 
The secure key rate formula in Raymond protocol is: 
2 ( ( ))( ) [ ( | , ) ( ) ]EC XRaymond z
leak e
R P Q q S A E n
n
  


                  （4） 
where see parameter definition and statistical fluctuation method in Ref.[22]. we 
emphasize that because the bit error rate estimation uses failure probability 0UCBC   
to guarantee the high consistance of bits of communication parties, we suppose error 
verification stage is ideal. 
    Figure 2 shows the dependent relationship between secure key rate and sending 
length under three cases where security parameters are different and channel loss is 
15t  dB:  
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Figure 2: contrast diagram of secure key rate with different security parameters 
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In figure 2,the blue curve represents the secure key rate under the conditions that 
security parameter of final key is 310  with finite-key length, the red one represents 
510 ,and the green one represents 1010 ,while the black spotted curve represents the 
key rate with infinite-key length. It shows that when the finite-key length is 1310 , the 
ratios between key rate deviation resulted from related security parameters and the one 
with infinite-key length are respectively 0.06%、0.14% and 0.23%, which is consist 
with the result confirmed in figure 1. So we demonstrate that a right length exits which 
realizes that the influence of security parameter on secure key rate can be ignored.   
4 Fair efficiency comparisons  
4.1 Importance 
It is the aim of fair efficiency comparison to analyze the main element 
influencing secure key rate on the finite-key condition deeply through comparison, and 
the significance is to provide reference for promoting further secure key rate of 
decoy-state QKD protocols with biased basis choice. In particular, for the same 
sending length and UC security parameter of final key, our work provides a reference 
platform of fair efficiency comparison of decoy-state QKD protocols under UC 
security standard. Besides, through the fair efficiency comparison of typical protocols, 
we verify the main elements influencing secure key rate and search for optimization 
methods to improve it. 
4.2 Conditions 
When we give the fair efficiency comparisons of typical decoy-state QKD 
protocols, we need to analyze the following conditions besides the same sending (or 
receiving) length, UC security parameter of final key and statistical fluctuation 
method. 
（1）secure key rate formula: mainly include the one based on GLLP formula and 
the one based on smooth entropy, and we will analyze the influence on secure key 
generation rate between different formulas in the fair efficiency comparisons; 
（2）light intensity choice: the way of generating key in the Z (X) basis of signal 
state, in both Z and X basis of signal state , in Z (X) basis of all pulses and more, and 
their influence will be analyzed in the comparisons, too.  
（3）the single bit error rate estimation method: we tend to estimate by signal 
state or decoy state, and similarly their influence will be analyzed in the comparisons. 
（4）population sample of parameter estimation choice: include the number of 
sending light pulses (see in Ref.[17,24]) and receiving light pulses (see in Ref. 
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[22,32,33]) , and they are supposed to be the same when giving comparisons.  
Other parameters remain unchanged apart from the above conditions. In addition, 
we don’t limit the consistency in the comparison procedure towards parameters 
adjusting changes in the numerical optimization course, such as the ratio of basis bias 
choice, the radio of light intensity and security parameters adjusting in each 
postprocessing stage, so we note that the fair comparison in this article is relatively 
fair. 
4.3 Comparisons towards schemes based on different formula of secure key rate 
So far, we haven’t seen fair efficiency comparison towards schemes based on 
GLLP formula and smooth entropy. Here taking decoy-state BB84 protocol with 
biased basis choice in the Z basis of signal state, we give a fair efficiency comparison 
between protocols based on GLLP formula and the ones based on Devetak-Winter 
bound and smooth entropy under UC security standard for the first time. 
The fair comparison preconditions are assumed as: UC security parameters of 
final key are 10
84 10BB
  in them. Meanwhile, we choose the signal state’s light 
intensity larger than decoy state, and estimate the single bit error rate by decoy state, 
where decoy-state modes are weak and vacuum decoy state. Statistical fluctuation 
method is standard error analysis, and population sample of parameter estimation 
choice is the number of sending light pulses. For the sake of convenience, we just 
consider dark count rate, 61.7 10 , detector efficiency, 4.5% ,detector error rate, 
3.3% ,and channel loss ,  0,30t ,（单位……）in practical systems. 
Change 2
zq  into zq  in （3）, and （2） and （3）are respectively formula of 
secure key rate in two schemes. After numerical optimization we can get figure 3 
showing the contrast of two schemes when finite-key length  9 12 156 10 ,1 10 ,1 10N     . 
Here GLLP represents the scheme based on GLLP formula, and SE represents the one 
based on smooth entropy. 
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Figure 3 contrast diagram of secure key rate in two schemes with biased basis choice 
After numerical optimization, when the finite-key length is 96 10 , secure key rate 
of the protocol based on Devetak-Winter bound and smooth entropy is higher than the 
one based on GLLP formula. The degree of rate increase with three key length is 
shown in table 2. 
Table 2 ratios of rate increase 
channel loss\ 
finite-key 
length 
5 10 15 20 
96 10  4.09% 8.82% 22.12% 104.30% 
121 10  0.24% 0.45% 0.86% 1.79% 
151 10  0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 
 
We can see in table 2 that when the length is longer, the degree of rate increase is 
smaller and two curves of secure key rate in two schemes is closer, which almost 
coincide when 151 10N   . It fully verifies that two schemes are almost equivalent 
under the infinite-key condition. 
The main reason for higher secure key rate of protocol based on smooth entropy 
than the one based on GLLP formula with finite-key length is that the former needn’t 
meet the precondition de Finetti’s theorem requires, so the key rate formula is tighter. 
Another reason is resulted from security parameter. The UC security parameter of 
final key is given by 1084 10BB
 ,while the security parameter demanded in the 
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postprocessing stage of protocol based on GLLP formula is higher, so its secure key 
generation rate is lower according to the conclusion in chapter 3 that when the security 
parameter is smaller, the deviation of statistical fluctuation and secret key bits 
consumed in each postprocessing stage is larger. Another advantage of the protocol 
based on smooth entropy is that we can give the secure key length which can be 
distillated in the privacy amplification stage through small smooth entropy viewed 
from Information Theory. Therefore, we can remove the secure key information 
acquired by Eve in a better way. 
4.4 Comparisons towards schemes based on different light intensity choices 
On the base of research in Ref. [22], we compare the secure key rate in schemes 
generating key in all light intensity（UC-Both）and the ones in single signal state. 
Raymond protocol chooses the signal state’s light intensity smaller than 
decoy-state, and sets the probability of Alice choosing X basis is 1 when sending 
decoy state, making the decoy-state detection rate higher and the degree of influence 
of statistical fluctuation to carry on parameter estimation by decoy state lower. 
However, according to Ref. [17], only when decoy-state light intensity is smaller is 
estimation accuracy better, so there exists a negative effect. Besides, UC security 
parameter of final key in Raymond protocol is 510Ray
 , isn’t very secure. 
The preconditions of fair comparison are set as: the UC security parameters of 
final key are 1010UC
 , and we choose the signal state’s light intensity larger than 
decoy-state. Bias basis setting is that the probability of choosing Z basis is larger than 
that of X basis but not equal to 1, whichever light intensity is sent. And statistical 
fluctuation method is Law of Large Numbers, and population sample of parameter 
estimation is the number of sending light pulses. Besides we still use ways in 
Raymond protocol in single bit error rate estimation method, decoy-state modes and 
parameter value choices in practical systems.  
    The formula of secure key rate in UC-Both protocol is: 
2
2
( ( ))
( ) [ ( | , ) ( ) ]
( ( ))
( ) [ ( | , ) ( ) ]
v
EC Z
Both z
EC Z
v z v
v
leak e
R P Q q S A E n
n
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P Q v q S A E v n
n
  



   
  
                 （5） 
where the designing process, define of related parameter and statistical fluctuation 
method with finite-key length is referred in Ref. [37]. 
The finite-key length  12 151 10 ,1 10N    , and through numerical optimization we 
can get the contrast diagram of secure key rate as figure 4. 
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Figure 4 fair efficiency comparisons towards related schemes based on different light intensity 
choices 
Through fair efficiency comparison we can come to the conclusion that though 
the key length is comparatively long( 151 10N   ), the secure key rate of UC-Both 
protocol, rising 35% on the base of the original, is always better than UC-Raymond 
protocol, which shows clearly that involving decoy state in key generation can 
increase secure key generation rate to a degree. 
4.5 Comparisons towards schemes based on different single bit error rate estimation 
methods 
Taking T12 protocol in Ref. [32] for an example, we verify the influence on 
secure key rate of the protocols between different single bit error rate estimation 
methods. Toshiba claimed that T12 protocol is the experimental implementation of the 
highest key generation rate currently. The original protocol generates key in both Z 
and X basis, raising secure key rate largely, meanwhile, it uses X basis part of signal 
state to carry on the single bit error rate estimation, and its advantage is decreasing the 
influence of statistical fluctuation. However, you must open the measuring information 
of X basis in the bit error rate estimation, but T12 protocol don’t make it plain that 
how to solve the problem resulted from that X basis is not only involved in generating 
key but also sample estimation. 
On the base of T12 protocol, we define that conducting the single bit error rate 
estimation by signal state is TS method, and by decoy state is TD method. The 
preconditions of this kind of fair comparison is set as: the UC security parameters of 
final key are 101 10Toshiba
  , and decoy-state modes are two weak decoy states, 
 15 
satisfying 
1 2 0v v  . And population sample of parameter estimation choice is the 
number of receiving light pulse, and statistical fluctuation method is standard error 
analysis. Besides, we still use ways in T12 protocol in key generation ways, light 
intensity choice, bias basis setting, and parameter choice in practical systems. 
The finite-key length  12 151 10 ,1 10N    ,and through numerical optimization we 
can get the contrast diagram of secure key rate between two estimation methods as 
figure 5(we use figure 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 to denote the above left, the above right, 
the lower left and the lower right subgraphs), where the horizontal axis is transmission 
distance, and the vertical axis is secure key rate. 
0 50 100 150
10
-6
10
-4
10
-2
10
0
Comparison-3-1
Transmission Distance(km)
S
e
c
u
re
 k
e
y
 r
a
te
 
 
N=1e+12(TS)
N=1e+12(TD)
0 50 100 150
10
-6
10
-4
10
-2
10
0
Comparison-3-2
Transmission Distance(km)
S
e
c
u
re
 k
e
y
 r
a
te
 
 
N=1e+15(TS)
N=1e+15(TD)
0 50 100 150
10
-6
10
-4
10
-2
10
0
Comparison-3-3
Transmission Distance(km)
S
e
c
u
re
 k
e
y
 r
a
te
 
 
TS(N=1e+12)
TS(N=1e+15)
0 50 100 150
10
-6
10
-4
10
-2
10
0
Comparison-3-4
Transmission Distance(km)
S
e
c
u
re
 k
e
y
 r
a
te
 
 
TD(N=1e+12)
TD(N=1e+15)
 
Figure 5 fair efficiency comparisons of related schemes with different estimation methods 
We can see from figure 5.1 that when 121 10N   , these two different estimation 
methods have their own advantages respectively in raising key rate under the condition 
of different transmission distances. Taking figure 5.1 as an example, specific 
quantitative analysis is shown in table 3. 
Table 3 efficiency comparison in T12 protocol based on different single 
 bit error rate estimation methods 
Transmission 
distances（km）\key 
rate （Mbps） 
signal state’s 
estimation (the 
original protocol) 
the second 
decoy-state 
estimation 
estimation 
involved in both 
signal state and 
decoy state 
35 3.506 3.941 3.941 
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50 1.710 1.869 1.869 
65 0.823 0.850 0.850 
80 0.382 0.351 0.382 
Table 3 shows the the condition of key rate value choice got between two 
different estimation methods referring to four typical distance points chosen in T12 
protocol, and the last column is the results of comprehensive consideration. In 
combination with figure 5.1, we can see that along with the distance increase causing 
the increase of channel loss, the parameter estimation sample decreases, and so the 
degree of the influence of statistical fluctuation rises. Under the condition of 
estimating single bit error rate based on the second decoy state and small channel loss, 
we get the higher key rate than TS method, and this fact demonstrates that the effect 
using decoy state to estimate is better. However, when channel loss is larger (e.g. 
80km-120km), the key rate in TD protocol is lower than TS, and the reason is that at 
this moment the sample amount of signal state in estimation is larger than the second 
decoy state, and so the degree of the influence of statistical fluctuation is small, 
making the upper bound of single bit error estimation tighter and key rate higher than 
the latter. We can conclude from the last column that the method of choosing the 
tightest estimation value because of the comprehensive consideration of signal state 
and decoy state involved in estimation is better than the first two. 
Figure 5.2 shows that when 151 10N   , the effect of using TD method is always 
better than TS method, which shows when the sending length is long, we will get more 
accurate result by using decoy state to estimate. 
Figure 5.3 and 5.4 reveal contrast diagrams of secure key rate when choosing TS 
and TD methods respectively with different key lengths. We can find that when we 
choose signal state to estimate, the secure key rate of two lengths is always close. 
However, when we choose decoy state, along with channel loss increasing, the 
difference of two lengths’ secure key rate is larger and larger. As a result, we verify 
further that in resistance to the statistical fluctuation, the method of using signal state 
to estimate is better than decoy state. 
After the analysis of four figures in figure 5, in the decoy-state QKD protocols 
with biased basis choice and under the condition of different sending lengths and 
channel losses, the influence on secure key rate of single bit error rate estimation 
methods has their own advantages, and therefore, we can promote the secure key rate 
further by means of comprehensive consideration in practical QKD systems. 
    Through above three aspects’ analysis of fair efficiency comparison, we provide a 
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standard and platform of efficiency comparison for typical decoy-state protocols with 
finite-key length, and on the base of fair efficiency comparison, we analyze and verify 
the major elements influencing secure key rate. At the same time we find the 
optimization methods to promote secure key rate of the protocol.     
6. Conclusion 
Towards the problem that security standards are different in decoy-state QKD 
protocols, we research the unified quantification of security parameter between 
decoy-state protocols based on GLLP formula and the ones based on Devetak-Winter 
and smooth entropy under UC security standard, and for the first time we give a fair 
efficiency comparison between two kinds of protocols. Besides, the impact of different 
sending length and secure parameters on secure key rate is shown, and we investigate 
the ways for improving secure key rate. The fair efficiency comparison mainly aims at 
typical protocols based on different formula of secure key rate, key generating part and 
the single bit error rate estimation methods. When meeting the prerequisite of fair 
comparison, through numeral optimization, the secure key rate of protocols based on 
Devetak-Winter bound and smooth entropy is better than the ones based on GLLP 
formula, and the method generating key in all light intensity can improve secure key 
generation rate further. Different single bit error estimation methods have advantages 
and disadvantages, and through comprehensive consideration we can improve secure 
key rate further. 
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